Introduction
In his seminal paper, Bewley (1982) applies capital theory to general equilibrium theory. He considers a model with infinitely many periods and perfect future markets where transactions are taking place among infinitely lived heterogeneous agents who discount the future. He shows that a dynamic general equilibrium (GE) path in this decentralized market model converges as time passes, if the future is sufficiently important.
As he points out in the introduction of his paper, the limit of an equilibrium path depends upon initial conditions.
In contrast, in the traditional turnpike theorems it is shown that there is a path (turnpike) with the following two characteristics [McKenzie (1976) ]:
(1) any optimal paths stay within a small neighborhood of the turnpike almost all the time, (2) the turnpike is independent of initial conditions (and terminal conditions if a finite time horizon model is considered).
Since the result of Bewley lacks the second characteristic above, it is weaker than the traditional theorems.
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The first result of this study is that the dynamic GE model also has a turnpike with both characteristics (1) and (2). We will show that for any initial condition and any positive
there is a period such that an equilibrium path satisfying the initial condition stays within the Eneighborhood of the turnpike after the period, as long as the future is sufficiently important.
The allocation which is repeated every period on the turnpike is characterized as the equilibrium of an ordinary static general equilibrium model. This model is independent of initial conditions and has the single period technology and utility functions upon which the dynamic GE model is based [see Bewley (1982, eq. (1.18 ))]. The intuitive reason for our turnpike theorem is the following: If the future becomes more and more important, the temporary component of each consumer's wealth, or the value of his initial capital, becomes negligible since the permanent component of his wealth, or the present value of the stream of his primary good endowments over the future, becomes closer and closer to infinity. Thus, the role of an initial allocation of capital in determining an equilibrium also becomes negligible.
The second result of this study is related to efficiency. In order to define an equilibrium path, we assume that a consumer, say, consumer i has the preference relation which is represented by the discounted sum of his utility functions, I,"= lpf~i(X,), where 0 < p < 1. An equilibrium path is, therefore, Pareto efficient with respect to their preference relations which reflect the future discounting.
It is often considered, however, that discounting the future should be attributed to the myopia of consumers, which is undesirable. Thus, it is worthwhile evaluating an equilibrium path with respect to preference relations which do not reflect their myopia but are based upon their tastes. For this purpose, we consider the following preference relation. That is, a consumption path {xi} is preferred to another path {xt} if limsup,,,~~=l(~i(~t)-ui(~~))<O.
W e call this preference relation a nonmyopic preference. It is shown that an equilibrium path is almost Pareto efficient with respect to non-myopic preferences in spite of the myopia of consumers.
As a direct corollary of this result, it is shown that the turnpike is Pareto efficient with respect to non-myopic preferences. Our turnpike theorem has two important implications which Bewley's theorem does not have. First, it provides a simple test of the market imperfection of an economy which does not have perfect future markets. Second, the turnpike theorem provides a dynamic foundation for static GE models.
We do not claim that our dynamic GE model is realistic. The model is useful, however, as a standard with which more realistic models of intertemporal allocation can be compared. Since our markets are purely perfect, the efficiency, which we consider for a dynamic GE path, is that with respect to one of the strictest standards.
If (3) Commodity space. For XER~, we define xPeRJ as follows. xT=xj if jeP and xj' = 0, otherwise. Let RP = {xr E RJ: x E RJ} and Rc = {x' E RP: x E R: >. In the same way, we define x0, R", xc' and so on.
(4) Technology. A social production set, I: relates capital input of the previous period to a production activity of the present period. Y is a closed convex cone in RP x RJ. ( -k, y) E Y means that if k 2 0 was kept as capital at the end of the previous period, then the producible goods ~'20 can be produced in the present period by using the primary goods y" 5 0. Note that yp+yo=y.
(5) Consumers. There are I consumers each of whom lives over the time horizon.
Let T= { 1,. . . , I}. In each period t = 1,. . ., consumer i has a consumption set Xi, a subset of RJ. XEX' means that he can supply primary goods x0 50 and consume ~'20. At initial period 0, he has the initial stock r&, ERT. He has a concave utility function ui: X'-+R.
(6) Production path and consumption path. A production path (-k, y) is a pair of sequences in RJ x RJ such that k = {k,, k,, . . .} y= {yi, y,, . .J and (-k,_l,y,)EY for all t=l,2 ,.... A consumption path for"consumer i,x, is a sequence in such 5 = {x1, x2,. .}, x, E for t 2 1.
(7) Feasible allocation and feasible path. The word 'allocation' often refers to a single period allocation of commodities, while an allocation of commodities over the time horizon is called an allocation path. A bundle e=(( -k, y), x1
x') is called an allocation path if (-_k, y) is a production path and >i _ >...,, is a consumption path of consumer i for i="1,. . . ,I. An allocation path, e, is feasible from an initial stock k, if y, -k, =xf= 1 xf , t 2 1, and if k, = k
An initial allocation of capital, (rc& _ . . , I&) E R$ x . . . x RT, is said to be adequate [see Bewley (1972 Bewley ( , 1982 ] if it satisfies the following:
(a) There are s>O,jECi, and ~'EX', i=l,...,I, such that %'+Ex(-I')=~~-Ic~ for some ( -icb, yi) E I: (b) There are E and XEX such that ~+e~~=y-rc, for some (-l~~,y)~ Y where IC~=~!=~ I&.
(a) means that each consumer can reproduce his own initial stocks with some surplus of a desired good. (b) means that the society can reproduce its own initial stocks with some surplus of every good. Similar assumptions are commonly used in equilibrium theory [see McKenzie (1959) , Debreu (1959 ), and Bewley (1972 , 1982 ] in order to ensure that everybody has positive income. (b) implies expansibility of initial stocks, which is commonly assumed in capital theory [see Gale (1967) , Brock (1970 ), Scheinkman (1976 , and McKenzie (1979)J (9) Discounted utility sum. Each consumer discounts future utilities by a discount factor p. Cz r $u'(x,) is consumer i's objective function.' Since, by Assumptions (A.6) and (A.8) below, we may normalize utility functions so that u'(x)LOfor all XEX', i=l,..., I, this infinite sum is well defined. Given an initial allocation of capital,
is a competitive equilibrium path with the discount factor p if it satisfies:
(ii) Utility maximization. xi(p) maximizes cg 1 p%I'(xJ subject to fl P,(P)% 5 PO(P)& and x, E Xi, t 2 1, where
have the same discount factor. This is justified by the fact that less patient consumers eventually consume nothing in the sufficiently far future [Ramsey (1928 ), Rader (1971 ), Becker (1980 ), and Bewley (1982 ].
(iii) Profit maximization.
forall(-k,-,,y,)ET:t~l,and(-k,_,(p),y,(p))EI:
tll.
(12) Marginal utility of income. Since each consumer maximizes his utility sum under his budget constraint, by the Kuhn-Tucker-Uzawa theorem [Takayama (1974, p. 48)] we may find the set of his marginal utilities of income at the equilibrium path as follows:
We call an element of F(&~),p(p)) consumer i's marginal utility of income at (e(p), P(P)). Y(P) = (Y'(P), . . .Y y'(p)) with y'(p) E T'@(p), p(p)) for all i is called a margi;al-utility-of-income vector of the equilibrium p"ath, (&I), p(p)); they are expressed as (e(p), E(P): Y(P)). (ii) xp maximizes W(x, y(p)) subject to qpx s(p-' -1) qPkP and x E X. where xP=~=~x~P and X=xf=,X'. Note that a long-run equilibrium (eP,qP) depends upon initial allocations of capital of (e(p), P(P)) since Y(P) depends upon (E(P), P(P)).
(1.5) Normalization of prices. For an equilibrium path and its marginalutility-of-income vector ($I), p(p): y(p)), we normalize the equilibrium price path p(p) so that If= I y'(p) = 1. By the Kuhn-Tucker-Uzawa theorem, the social"welfare maximization condition, (14.ii), implies that there is CI > 0 such that W(xp,y(p))--qPxpz W(x,y(p))--qpx for all XEX. We normalize qp so that CI= 1. Then, (17) Ramsey point and a limit pair. A pair of an allocation and a price with a marginal-utility-of-income vector, (e*, q*: y(p)), is a Ramsey point associated with a given initial allocation of capital if there is a sequence of equilibrium pairs, (n">= {G,), P(P,), ePn, qpn:y(p,))), with A-* 1 such that ($P,),P(P,)) is an equilibrium paIh from the initial allocation for all n and that (ePn, qp": y(p,)) converges to (e*, q*: y*). Moreover, if (&,),p(p,J) also converges to (e(l),p( 1)) pointwise, we say that rcpn converges "to a limit pair x1 = (e( l), p(l), e*l q*: I)*). e*(q*) is called a Ramsey allocation (price). (e(l), p( 1)) is called a" pseudo-equilibrium path, since a competitive equilibrium pat"h is defined for the case where the future is discounted.
(18) McKenzie equilibrium. Define the stationary net production set Z' as follows: Z' = {z E RJ: z = y -k, ( -k, y) E Y}. A pair of an allocation and a price, (e*,q*)=((-k*,y*), x1* ,..., XI*, * q ), is called a McKenzie equilibrium if it s:j t isfies:
is an extension of that of a quasi-stationary optimal path in capital theory [see Sutherland (1970) , Peleg and Ryder (1974) , McKenzie (1979), and Bewley (1982) ].
(ii) xi* maximizes ui(x) subject to q*x SO.
(iii) 0 = q*z* 2 q*z for all Z1 where z* = y* -k* E Z'.
(iv) z*=Cfzlxi*.
We call (e*,q*) a McKenzie equilibrium since this type of general equilibrium model is studied by McKenzie (1959,198l ). We will show that if the McKenzie equilibrium is uniquely determined, it is the turnpike. It characterizes the following stationary state. The present prices of future goods, q*, are equal to those of present goods. Each consumer repeats activity xi*, i=l ,. . . ,I, maximizing his utility in each period by spending as much as he earns q x * i* = 0 Producers choose capital input in a period and output and . primary-good input in the next period facing price q* in both periods; q*y* -q*k* = 0 since Y is a cone. The demand meets the supply every period; y*-k*=~f~,x'*.
(19) Non-myopic Pareto ejkiency.
It is said that consumer i strongly (weakly) prefers a consumption path 3' to another path x with respect to a non-myopic preference if lim supr+_, CT= i (u'(x,) -ui(x;)) < 0( 5 O).3 A feasible allocation path e = (( -,k, y), x1,. . . , $) from k is said to be Pareto efficient with respect to non-myo$c preferences if it satisfies the following. If for an allocation path e' =(( -_k', y'), x'l,. . . , &I), $i is weakly preferred to $ with respect to a non-myopic preference for all i and strongly preferred for at least one i, then e' is not feasible from k. A feasible allocation path e from k is said to be s-almost Pareto efficient with respect to non-myopic preferences if there is a feasible allocation path e' from k such that e' is Pareto efficient with respect to non-myopic preferences and that le, -e;l <E for all t 2 0.
Assumptions and results

Assumptions
Assumptions (A.l)<A.18) below are assumed in Yano (1984) in order to prove the Liapounov stability for a long run equilibrium (see Proposition 1 in section 4). They are weaker than the assumptions made by Bewley (1982) in a few respects. Readers are referred to Yano (1984) for detailed discussions on the assumptions. We assume Y is a closed convex cone in RP x RJ with the vertex at zero. % the literature of capital theory, x' is said to catch up to x if 3' is weakly preferred to 5 with respect to a non-myopic preference [see von Weizslcker (1963 Atsumi (1963 , Gale (1967 and Brock (1970) ]. (A.9). CnP#4 where C=U!=,Ci.
(AJO).
All consumers have a common discount factor O<p < 1. For any long-run equilibrium with b sp < 1, there is 0< Cr < 1 such that Es ct < 1 implies
(A.13). Substitutability.
Let (-k, k'+x) E I: XEX and k' ERP,. For any s'>O, there is E > 0 such that lx'1 2 E' implies ( -k, k' + 8~' +x0) E Y (A.24). Uniformly bounded marginal productivity of capital.
Let (-k, y) and (-k', y') be on the boundary of I: If for some long-run equilibrium capital stock, ke, with p sp < 1, Ik-kPI <E and Ik'-kPI <E, and if k'z k, ~"2 yp and y'O=yO, then there is q>O such that ly'P-yPI~nJk '-kl. (A.15) . Around the set of all Ramsey points, Y is a strictly convex cone and ui is strictly concave.4
Under Assumptions (A.l)-(A.15) we may prove that there is 0 <p < 1 such that for any adequate initial allocation of capital and for any p such that ps;p < 1, there is an equilibrium pair [see Yano (1984) ].
In addition to these assumptions we assume
(a.2). The production set Y can be expressed as a continuous production function f:RP xRJ+R such that f( -k, y)sO if and only if (-k, y)~ Y
4Y is said to be a strictly convex cone around the set of all Ramsey points if and only if there is F> 0 such that, for any Ramsey allocation (( -k*, y*), x1*, , x'*), I( -k', y') -( -k*, y*)l <E, I(-k",y"-(-k*,y*)l -CC, (-k',y')~X (-k",y")~K and (-k',y')#b(-k",y") for any fi?O imply that E( -k', y') + (1 -a)( -k", y") E interior Y, 0 <a < 1. Also ui is said to be strictly concave around the set of all Ramsey points if and only if there is E>O such that, for any Ramsey allocation ((-k*,y*), xl*>..., x1*), lx'-x'*(<E, ~x"-x'*~<~,x'~X~,x"~xi, and x'#x" imply that u'(ax'+ (1-a)x")>ctu'(x')+(l+cc)u'(x"),O<a<l.
Moreover, f has continuous first partial derivatives at the production vector (-k*, y*) of Ramsey allocation (( -k*, y*), x1*, . . . , XI*).
(a.2). There is at least one BET such that for any Ramsey allocation ((-k*, y*), x1*, . . . , xr*), the consumption vector xi* lies in the interior of X' and ui has continuous first partial derivatives at xi*.
Assumption (a.1) implies that the boundary of Y is smooth around the production vectors of Ramsey allocations. Assumption (a.2) is implied by the more basic assumption that there is a consumer whose indifference curves do not intersect the boundary of his consumption set and are smooth.
Results
We will prove the following theorems:
Theorem I. A Ramsey point is a McKenzie equilibrium Theorem 2. Turnpike theorem. Suppose that the single-period general equilibrium model (18.i)glg.iv) has the unique McKenzie equilibrium, (e*,q*). Then (e*,q*) is independent of initial allocations of capital. Moreover, for any adequate initial allocation of capital and for any E > 0 there is 0 <p' < 1 such that the following holds. There is T 2 1 such that if@(p), p(p)) is an equilibrium path from the initial allocution and if p'sp<l, (er(P)-e*I<s and lqr(p)-q*l<s for all t >= T where qt(p) =p-*pt(p).
Theorem 2 implies that the allocation path (e*, g*) = {(e:,q:)} such that (e:,q:)=(e*,q*) for all t is the turnpike of our economy. The theorem does not imply that (e,(p), qt(p)) converges to (e*,q*), but implies only that it converges to a small neighborhood of (e*,q*). This type of a turnpike theorem is called a neighborhood turnpike theorem [McKenzie (1979) ].
Theorem 3. For any equilibrium allocation path e(p) from a given adequate initial allocation of capital and for any E > 0, there is 0< p' < 1 such that the following holds: p'sp< 1 implies that e(p) is s-almost Pareto efficient with respect to non-myopic preferences.
Corollary I. The allocation path, e*, of the turnpike is Pareto eficient with respect to non-myopic preferences.
Proofs of theorems
Here, we will prove the theorems above. Let p be as in section 3. For each pair of an adequate initial allocation of capital and a discount factor p such that psp < 1, there may be multiple equilibrium. Take an adequate initial allocation, (K& . . . , ~6). For this initial allocation and for each discount factor p such that p sp < 1, we select an equilibrium pair and denote it as +'=($A P(P), ep, qP9 CY(P)), e(p) = {e,(p)), e,(p)=((-kk,-r(p), Y,(P)),
x:(P), . '. 3 x:(P)), p"(P) = {Pt(P,>, and eP=(( -kP, y"), xlp,. . . , x'"). Moreover, let c&) = pefpt(p). We will first prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem I. Take a Ramsey point (e*,q*: y(l)) to which a sequence (ePn, q? y(p,)) converges. In the next section, we will prove: Since qj'+q* #O by Lemma 1, (18.i) holds by (14.i). Since qp"+q* #O and ( -kPn, yPn)+( -k*, y*), (14.iii) 
implies (18.iii) and (14.iv) implies (18.iv). Note that (15.i) implies ui(xip)-yi(p)qpxipzui(x)-yi(p)qpx
for all XEX', for all i. Thus, since xlP* +x1*, @'"+.1*#0, and y'(p,)+y'(l), we have ni(xi*) -?(l)q *xi* >ui(x) -yi(l)q*x, for all XEX'. Thus, if we prove q*x'* =0 for all i, (18.ii) nolds. Therefore, in order to prove the theorem, it suffices to show q*x'* =0 for all i.
We will use the following lemma (see the next section for a proof).
Lemma 2. For any E>O there are O<p'< 1 and Tz 1 such that p'spll implies (e,(p) -eP( <E and (qt(p) -qp( < E for all t 2 ?:
Define 1, = {iE E q*x'* > 0} and r_ = {iE in q*x'* CO}. By the definition of r+ we may choose E>O and 6 >O such that [q-q*1 ~6 and lx-xi*1 ~6 imply qxz&E/2 for all iei,. Since (eP",qpn)+(e*,q*), there is N' such that Iqp"-q*l<6/2 and (xip" -x'*l<6/2 for all n?N' and all iE1 Since ~"41, by Lemma 2 there is NZN ' and T such that Iqt(pn)-qp"( <J/2 and Ixf(p") -xip"I <6/2 for all nz N and all t 2 7: Thus, since, for all nz N and tZI+&")-q*l<~ and (xf(p")-xi*l<6, the definition of 6 implies q,(p")xf(p") 2 42 for all i E i+ . Therefore, by using a similar method for i E i-, we may establish that there are N and 7' such that i~i, (iEr_) implies q,(p")xf(p") > 0 ( < 0) for all n 2 N and t 2 T.
In order to show the theorem, it suffices to show that i+ = i_ =@ Suppose i, #Ca. Let i E i, and T and N be as above. Lemma 1 implies that IP,(P")~ and IxfW)I are uniformly bounded with respect to t and n. Thus, (iv> P,(lMlW as t + co. In the next section, we will prove Lemma 3. e,(l)-+e* and p,(l)+q* as t-+co.
By (iv) and Lemma 3, pt(l)xf(l)+q*x'* =O. This contradicts that i ET,. Thus, T+ = 4. Since I_ =c$ can be shown in the same way, Theorem 1 is proved.
We now prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Theorem 1 and the hypothesis of Theorem 2 that there is the unique McKenzie equilibrium (e*,q*), the Ramsey point is also unique. Since the system (18.i)-(18.iv) is independent of initial allocations of capital, so is (e*,q*). Therefore, by the definition of a Ramsey point, for any E > 0 there is 0 <p" < 1 such that p" 5p < 1 implies leP-e*l <.s/2 and l@p;;;l < 42 f or any equilibrium pair with any adequate initial allocation of For equilibrium pairs (g(p), p(p), eP, q? y(p)) with a given adequate initial allocation, choose p" 5 p' < 1 and T 2 1 so that p' 5 p < 1 and t 2 T imply l&4 -eP( < s/2 and ICAP) -Q'I< 42, w ere h
qt(p)=p-fpt(p).
Since p'sp<l and t 2 1 imply that le,(p) -e*l <E and lqt(p) -q*l < E, Theorem 2 is proved.
We now prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose e(p") and ep" of equilibrium pair +'" with a given adequate (~6, . . ., K',) converge to e(l) and e*, respectively, of its limit pair, 7~~. We first show that I converges to e( 1) uniformly with respect to t. Choose E > 0 arbitrarily.
Sine ep"+e*, there is N > 0 such that lePn -e*l < 43 for all 12 2 N. By Lemmas 2 and 3 above, there are T > 0 and N' 2 N such that le,(l) -e*l <c/3 and le,(p,) -ePnl <c/3 for all t 2 T and nz N'. Then for all t 2 T and n 2 N', we have that le,(p,) -e,( 1)15 /e,(p) -ePnl + lePn -e*l + le* -e,(l)1 <E. Since e(p,)+,(l), pointwise, we may choose N"z N' such that le,(p,) -e,(l)1 <E for all c 5 T and nl N". Thus since we have that lg(p,) -e(l)l, <E for all nz N" , e(p,) converges to e(l), uniformly.
In order to complete the proof, suppose that e(l) is not Pareto efficient with respect to non-myopic preferences. Then there is a feasible allocation path e' = (( -k', y'), x'l, . . . , x") from Cf= 1 ICY such that lim sup,, n CT= 1 (u'(xf(1)) -u'(x:')jgO for all i with strict inequality for some i, where $( 1) is of e( 1). Let y( 1) be of limit pair x1. Then, it holds,
6)
where xi =c!= lx;i. This contradicts the following lemma (see the next section for a proof).
Lemma 4. Pseudo-equilibrium
path e(l) of limit pair I? is (overtaking) optimal with respect to { W(x, y( 1))) where y( 1) is of 72; i.e., for any feasible path e from the initial allocation of e(l), lim sup,, m Et'= 1 (W(x,, y( 1)) -W(x,( l), y( 1))) 50, where x,=~f=,xf,~,(1)=~f=~~f(1), xi is ofe, and x'(l) is ofg(l).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Corollary 1 may be proved in the same way. We therefore omit a proof.
Remark I. Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 can be established without assuming Assumptions (a.1) and (a.2). These assumptions are used only to establish Lemmas 2 and 3. In the proof of Theorem 3, we may use Sublemmas 7 and 9 in the next section, which do not require (a.1) and (a.2), instead of Lemmas 2 and 3.
Remark 2.
Another preference relation for a consumer who does not discount the future may be considered by using weak maximality [Brock (1970) ]. That is, a path x' may be said to be strongly (weakly) preferred to another path x if lim inf,, ,cT= 1 (u'(x,) -u'(x;)) < 0( 5 0). The definition of Pareto efficiency may be based upon this preference. Unfortunately, however, Pareto efficiency of a pseudo-equilibrium path cannot be shown under this definition; although the first inequality of (i) holds for 'limsup' instead of 'lim inf', the second inequality does not hold in the case of 'lim sup'. This fact is due to the difference in 'strength' of these two preference orderings.
If a sequence (~4;) of utilities is strongly preferred to {u,} in the 'lim sup' sense, then there is some T such that c:= i ur<C:= 1 u: for all tz T There may not be such T even if {u;} is strongly preferred to {at} in the 'lim inf' sense. It merely implies that I:= ru, < I:= iu: for infinitely many t. Thus, the 'lim sup' preference has 'stronger' implications than the 'liminf one.
Proof of lemmas
Lemmas 1 and 4 can be proved without using Assumptions (a.1) and (a.2). Let np and the variables associated with rep be as in the first paragraph of the previous section. We first prove Lemma 1.
To begin with, we may prove the following sublemma [for a proof see Yano (1984, Lemmas 3, 4, 6 , and 7)]. 
ProoJ
This can be proved by a method similar to that which proves Lemma 12 in Yano (1984) .
The inequality defining T'@(p), p(p)) in (12) readily implies
for all x E X, all t 2 1, all i, all p such that p 5 p < 1. Thus, by the definition of the social welfare function in (13) and the normalizations of prices in (15), (iii) implies
for all x E X, all t, and all p such that fi 5 p < 1. Moreover, (11 .iii) implies
for all (-k,y) E I: all t2 1, and all p such that fiip< 1. Substituting xp=& 1 xip and (-kP, y") for x and (-k, y) in inequalities (iv) and (v), respectively, and adding the two inequalities, we have (vi) z=tI PV%(P),Y(P))-WC@>Y(P))) ZP,-,(P)(k, -1(P) -@') for all tl0 and p such that p"zp<l. 
Proof:
This may be proved by the method similar to that used to prove Lemma 5 of Yano (1984) . (iv) and (v), for any p1 zZp < 1, we have I%(P)) +&MP) 2 IQ') +%(P) (kP + cx'). Thus, since q@) (k,(p) 
Note that qt(p) = p -'p,(p). We will prove
Thus we have some F >O such that for any p1 5 p < 1,
Suppose that Id(p)I is not uniformly bounded for t and p. Then, by Sublemma 1 we may choose {p,, t.} with p1 5p, < 1 and t,ZO such that P~+P, k,"+' kP"-+kP, )qp,(pJ/ -+a and q~(~,)l)q~(~J/+~. Note cb'>O. But by (vii) c4'xp=0, a contradiction. Thus lqf'(p)I is uniformly bounded.
Suppose that (q&r)\ IS not uniformly bounded in p and t. Then, by Sublemma 1, we may choose {p,, t,,) with p1 5p, < 1 and t, 20 such that pn+p. The second inequality follows since q,(p) (k,(p) 
is uniformly bounded by the first part of this proof. Since, by the market clearing condition,
Since, by Sublemma 4, X n Yp has a non-empty interior, (ix) contradicts (viii). This completes the proof.
Define XF = {(x1,. . . , xT)EXT: (-k,pI,yt) EY, x,=y,-k,, t=l,. ..,?; ko=rco, and k,=O}, where XT is the Cartesian product of T X's. We may prove Sublemma 6. XT n XT has a non-empty interior.
Proof.
Due to Lemma 5 of Yano (1984) .
We may prove: Sublemma 7. For each E >O, there are 0 < p' < 1 and T2 1 such that p's p < 1 implies le,(p) -ePl < E .for all t 2 T
ProoJ:
By Theorem 3 of Yano (1984) .
We now prove Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. By Sublemma 1, it suffices to show that there are /I>0 and 0 <p' < 1 such that p'sp < 1 implies l&)1 < /? for all t 20. Let E' and p1 be as in Sublemma 3. By Sublemma 7, we may choose p'2p2 and Tz 1 such that I&I) -P <E' for all tz T -1 and all p such that p'sp < 1. Then, by Sublemma 5, l&)1 b IS ounded uniformly in t 2 T and p such that p' 5 p < 1. Thus, it sufticies to show that Ip,(p)l is bounded uniformly in p such that p'5pp<l
for tsT-1. By (iv), we have for some s>O for infinitely many t's Then, as noted above, 6, >6 for some 6 >O for infinitely many t's. Then, ~j'=16t-+c0 as t-+c~. By Sublemma 1, I~r(l)( and Ik,(l)l are bounded uniformly in 7: Moreover, we may prove that any feasible path {e,} is bounded uniformly in t [see Yano (1984) , Lemma 31. Thus, since ~r( l)(k,(l) -kT) is bounded uniformly in 7; and since ~~=r C?+GO, (xvi)
implies CT= 1 ( W(x,) -W(x,( 1))) + -cc. This proves Lemma 4.
Lemmas 2 and 3 require Assumptions (a.1) and (a.2), and are extensions of Sublemmas 7 and 9. Whereas the stability of only allocation paths is shown in the sublemmas, the lemmas assert that of price paths as well. Since Assumptions (a.1) and (a.2) simply require that the indifference surfaces of a consumer and the boundary of the production set are smooth, we may prove Lemmas 2 and 3 by routine methods. Proofs are therefore omitted.
